Another guest post from a SAISer wishing to remain anonymous, the analysis below looks at a South Asian country the international community seems largely unconcerned with.
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On 28 February 2010, Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) paramilitary force arrested five suspected operatives of the Pakistan-based terrorist network Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in Dhaka for allegedly planning attacks in India. The five suspects included one Pakistani and four local nationals. One of the Bangladeshi nationals arrested, Nannu Mian (Billal), had spent 10 years in an Indian jail for his involvement in the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight 814 in 1999. Bangladeshi authorities claim that a series of actions last year against suspected Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI) cells disrupted impending attacks on the American embassy and the British and Indian High Commissions in Dhaka.
This latest disrupted plot marks a departure from established patterns of terrorist activity in Bangladesh. Indigenous extremist groups like the Jamaat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) pursued an agenda of sectarianism and social revolution; this resulted in symbols of Bangladesh’s secular legal institutions and cultural pluralism being targeted until the RAB managed to suppress both groups. On the other hand, operatives of transnational groups such as LeT and JeM were believed to be using Bangladesh for logistical support and infiltration into India, but did not conduct offensive operations in-country. However, this particular cell’s selection of American, British, and Indian diplomatic missions in Dhaka constitutes an “internationalization” of Bangladesh’s terrorism problem, where both the aggressors and the targets are primarily foreigners.
For Bangladesh itself, a successful attack would present a number of problems, each of them multifaceted. Bangladesh is still recovering from negative international attention stemming from its struggle with the JMB and JMJB, and this episode poses a new threat to a nation heavily dependent on its resident international development community. Indo-Bangladesh relations, which have greatly improved since the 2009 election of the secular Awami League (AL) in Bangladesh, would again become contentious; the spirit of cooperation fostered by Bangladesh’s arrest of Assamese and Pakistani militants would likely diminish. Domestically, the AL should be expected to rhetorically link a JeM or LeT attack to Bangaldesh’s independence war with Pakistan, and accuse the opposition and its allies in the minor Islamist parties of complicity. The AL will likely exploit the population’s fears of extremism to make draconian and ill-advised political plays, such as a recent attempt to ban all religious political parties. [5]
Should this trend of internationalization continue, the objectives of the indigenous and transnational groups could converge. The leadership of JMB, JMJB, and HUJI’s Bangladesh wing derives much of their legitimacy from their experience training and fighting in Afghanistan and their ties to the international jihadi movement. If the indigenous groups opt to forego their unattainable objectives of social revolution for LeT or JeM’s platform of guaranteed wanton destruction, South Asia will be presented with yet another regional crisis.











