Reintegrating the Taliban

There has been much discussion over the last few days about U.S. support of an Afghan plan to reintegrate the Taliban who, in Hillary Clinton’s words, “renounce Al Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the constitutional system.”

The plan provides a package of incentives (money and jobs) to Taliban fighters who “lay down their arms and return to civilian life.”

The manner in which the U.S. (and other Western countries) has pursued policy in Afghanistan and specifically vis-à-vis the Taliban can only be categorized as confused and contradictory. Back at the Bonn Conference in 2001, the Taliban were excluded from discussions regarding the future of Afghanistan and the important task of rebuilding the country. This proved unsustainable, leaving powerful leaders with no incentive to see the new Afghanistan succeed and ensured that continued fighting remained their modus operandi.

Now Defense Secretary Robert Gates has suggested that while the Taliban are a “cancer,” they are part of the “political fabric” of Afghanistan and can no longer be ignored. Of course, this statement is in itself quite confusing. Why would one be persuaded to support the growth of cancer in a society?

Clearly, part of the problem stems from the categorization of these disparate entities. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband assures us that “we don’t conflate or confuse Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The Taliban leadership do not have as their principle aim Al Qaeda’s violent global jihadist agenda.” Yet, the policy of the last few years doesn’t indicate that this difference has been fully realized or at least, has not been effectively conveyed to the public. By referring to Al Qaeda and Taliban so often in the same breath, the U.S. has done itself a disservice; it has failed to isolate those groups that are truly a threat to U.S. soil and those with whom they would merely prefer not to see in power. Perhaps waging a war on both fronts would be advisable if the war was being won.

In addition, by failing to distinguish between disparate militant groups and acknowledging different reasons behind their existence today, the varied elements have been irresponsibly grouped into the nebulous category of the Taliban and the root causes of their actions have been ignored. In fact, Gates is still refusing to acknowledge differences within numerous militant groups. He stated, “You can’t say one’s good and one’s not good. They’re all insidious, and safe havens for all of them need to be eliminated.” In Pakistan in particular, the problem of militant group is multifaceted and complex. It is erroneous to assume that each group has the same aims and ambitions or resources; the groups differ with regard to their ties to Al Qaeda and the extent to which their concerns are locally-based. The means of dealing with them will therefore no doubt also be different.

As a final thought, while I’m on the topic of language and its effect (how appropriate for a blog entitled Poets and Policymakers!), Holbrooke has finally come to his senses and decided to do away with the phrase “Af-Pak.” Apparently, it has been brought to his attention that Pakistan isn’t quite a fan of this coupling. A bit of a relief, though I was hoping that Mosharraf Zaidi’s projection that Af-Pak would be the new catch phrase might prove accurate: “”In the future, when countries go belly-up, they will say, “Whoa, look at them. They just went totally Af-Pak.”"