To say that the Pakistani military and intelligence service have been engaged in “double-dealings” with the Afghan Taliban is hardly a controversial or contested statement today. Even Pakistani officials would grudgingly admit to some level of contact by “rogue elements.” Disagreement arises, of course, in determining the extent of the illicit relationship as it exists today (in the post-9/11 scenario).
Matt Waldman’s recent report for the London School of Economics’ Crisis States Research Center, “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan insurgents,” provides one account. He alleges, in no uncertain terms, that the ISI, Pakistan’s premier spy agency, “orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences” the Taliban movement and “provides huge support in terms of training, funding, munitions, and supplies.”
Most striking of the allegations is that the policy of supporting the Taliban has been approved by the highest levels of the civilian government, ie. by President Zardari. Waldman writes:
According to a Talib who has regular contact with members of the Quetta Shura, in late March or early April this year President Zadari and a senior ISI official visited some 50 high-ranking Talibs who were held in a prison in a secret location in Pakistan. Some 30-35 had been arrested in recent months, and 10-15 were longer-term prisoners. Reportedly, he told them they were arrested because he was under a lot of pressure from the Americans and that, ‘you are our people, we are friends, and after your release we will of course support you to do your operations.’
Despite the Pakistani penchant for a good conspiracy theory, Waldman’s report, and this account in particular, has come under scalding criticism from many local analysts and journalists. Even Ahmed Rashid, whose work Waldman relied on in his report, contested the findings, saying, “”It doesn’t make any sense to me. The last person the Taliban would want to see is Asif Zardari.”
An American official was quoted in same article as saying, “The ISI makes life difficult for us in many ways. But this would be a step too far.” My views exactly.
Ultimately, the report regurgitates mostly pre-existing and well-known claims, and fails to provide substantial evidence for the new allegations which it does put forward (and uses the word “apparently” an annoying number of times. It also doesn’t help that Waldman misspells Zardari throughout the report, referring to “Zadari” instead.)
Still, while I remain skeptical of the veracity of some of Waldman’s claims, I do agree with one of his central policy prescriptions:
“The only sure way to secure such cooperation is to address the fundamental causes of Pakistan’s insecurity, especially its latent and enduring conflict with India.”
A regional solution to Afghanistan is key, particularly with the looming American retreat from the country. The manner in which Pakistan views its own strategic concerns vis-à-vis India, whether or not the international community believes that this is merely an unhealthy obsession, is significant. Thus, India-Pak relations, including the intractable Kashmir conflict – both the discontent they have caused among Muslims in South Asia and their impact on Pakistan’s geo-strategic designs, undercutting the progress that needs to be made on the Afghan border – is intricately intertwined with peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is pertinent to recall that many of the insurgent groups in Pakistan now lumped as Taliban or Al Qaeda-supporting once consisted of smaller, more locally-based organizations, many of which had been historically concerned with Kashmir. Aryn Baker wrote in Time Magazine in November 2008, “Until Pakistan is secure in its relationship with India, it will continue to believe that its interests are best advanced through clandestine support of the Taliban and other elements that destabilize Afghanistan.”
Now, how to go about arriving at Indo-Pak peace? I think I’ll let Brian or Sean address that in one of their upcoming posts. . .
As Obama tries to get in touch with his emotions, Niloufer succeeds with sarcasm, annoyance and perhaps even borderline anger.